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I. INTRODUCTION

Before the recent, well-publicized controversies surrounding
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restrictive public-sector labor legislation in Wisconsin and Ohio,'
unions in several other states achieved important legislative changes
that facilitated public-sector union organizing. Without much fanfare
or significant public controversy, between 2000 and 2009 a total of
eight states enacted card-check legislation for public-sector
employees. Card-check laws, which have been unsuccessfully
pursued by private-sector unions, mandate that employers recognize
the union as the representative of employees on the basis of signed
authorization cards without reliance on a representation election.3
Card check authorization benefits unions because it short circuits the
usual organizing process by eliminating the union's need to further
prove majority support in a secret ballot election.' But by doing so, it
imposes costs on employers by restricting their efforts to erode union
support through aggressive campaign tactics.! Our paper seeks to
better understand the development of these laws and their effects,
and in that way, identify lessons for future public-sector labor law and
unionization.
In particular, we examine two basic issues. First, we explore the
conditions which may have facilitated the enactment of card-check
legislation in the eight states that, since 2000, passed such laws. We
propose that laws mandating card check authorization represent a
natural progression in the legal regimes of states which have histories
of more progressive labor relations practices. The introduction of
card-check legislation in states with highly unionized public-sector
workforces, and where unions win a high percentage of certification
elections, should not evoke much controversy among labor relations
participants because relatively little is at stake. If the public-sector
2

1. See, e.g., Michael Rose, Labor Should Link NLRB Controversies to Economic Issues,
AFL-CIO Speakers Say, 230 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A16 (Nov. 30. 2011).
2. As discussed below, infra note 22, the 2007 New Hampshire's card-check law was
repealed in 2011. Oklahoma also repealed its law in 2011. Infra note 19.
3. At the federal level, the legislative effort is reflected in the Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA). For the most recent version of the EFCA, see H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560,
111th Cong. (2009). Similar bills had been introduced in three previous congressional sessions.
H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1925, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005);
S.842, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007).
4. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card
Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001); Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck:

Privileging "Employer Free Choice" Over Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87
NEB. L. REv. 329, 330 (2008); Jennifer M. Dillard & Joel F. Dillard, Fetishizing the Electoral
Process: The NLRB's Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism (Aug. 24, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), availableat <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009636>.
5. See Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing Method to
Cardsfrom Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A9 (describing employers' opposition to the
card check process).
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labor relations environment mitigates against aggressive employer
opposition to public-sector union organizing, which consequently
eases union organizing efforts and leads to higher union win rates in
certification elections, then public-sector employers may not object
strongly to changes in the organizing process that "benefit" unions.
Moreover, although such procedural changes may produce only
limited benefits to unions in what is already a relatively favorable
public-sector labor relations environment, they still benefit and, thus,
can be expected to promote card-check legislation. Accordingly, we
aver that the enactment of card-check laws depends on the presence
of various factors, namely the presence of pro-labor constituents and
characteristics of the political environment, which create favorable
conditions for unions to pursue their legislative agendas.
Second, we briefly discuss the effects of card-check laws on the
level of organizing activity for the eight states that passed the
legislation.6 Clearly, a card-check statute which mandates union
recognition on the basis of authorization card signatures should affect
unionization activity among public employees. One would expect
unions to gravitate towards "organizing technologies" which facilitate
the organizing process. Thus, the enactment of a card-check statute
should prompt public-sector unions to shift their organizing strategies
towards the use of card checks rather than elections. One would
expect also there to be workplaces where employees might prefer
union representation, but where such representation has not been
achieved. If so, the adoption of a card-check statute should enable
unions to not only organize new workplaces, but also new types of
workplaces. Consequently, card-check statutes should facilitate union
organizing and, thus, result in higher levels of union membership.
II. CARD CHECK AUTHORIZATION AND UNION REPRESENTATION

For many, the use of card check authorization represents a
departure from the normal method for achieving union recognition,
namely the certification election process. The origins of this
perspective date back to the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act in 1935 (NLRA).7 Interestingly, however, in the years
6. This section is based on the findings reported in Timothy Chandler & Rafael Gely,
Card-Check Laws and Public-Sector Union Membership in the States, 36 LAB. STUD. J. 445
(2011).
7. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(2008)).
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immediately following the enactment of the NLRA, the National
Labor Relations Board frequently certified unions on the basis of
card-check agreements.' During these early years, Board supervised
elections were typically used only when the employer questioned the
status of the union as the majority bargaining representative, while
the card-check process was the default recognition method.9 In the
mid-1940s, the Board began showing a preference for elections as the
primary means of union certification.'o This trend was further
solidified when Congress amended the NLRA in 1947 and began
requiring the Board to conduct a representation election whenever "a
question of representation" existed." Secret ballot elections became
the dominant method used by the Board to certify a union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of a group of employees.12
The NLRA's approach to card-check organizing was largely
incorporated by states' legislatures when they began to enact
collective bargaining laws for public employees.'" The majority of
state level collective bargaining laws provide union certification after
an election conducted by the appropriate state agency, but either
explicitly or implicitly allows public employers to voluntarily
recognize the union.1 For example, New Mexico's statute allows a
public employer and a labor organization "with a reasonable basis for
claiming to represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit" to establish "an alternative procedure for
determining majority status.""
A few states, however, deviate from the NLRA approach. Since
1958, New York's public-sector bargaining law has mandated the
corresponding administrative agency to "ascertain the public
organization
as
their
choice
of
employee
employees'
representative ... on the basis of dues deduction authorization or
8. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects
for Changing Paradigms,90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 857 (2005).
9.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT 734-36 (John Higgins, Jr., ed., 5th ed. 2006).
10. Brudney, supra note 8, at 858.
11. Among the amendments to the NLRA Congress adopted in 1947 was section
9(c)(1)(b) providing that "[i]f the Board finds upon the records of such hearing that such a
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the
results thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(b) (2008).
12. See Dillard & Dillard, supra note 4, at 16-18.
13. See Rafael Gely & Timothy Chandler, Organizing Principles:The Significance of CardCheck Laws, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 475, 484 (2012).
14. See id.
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-14C (2012).
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other evidence, or if necessary, by conducting an election." More
recently, various other states have enacted laws mandating card check
recognition for employees covered under their public-sector
collective bargaining laws. Unlike the traditional NLRA approach,
covered employers are required to recognize a union as the collective
bargaining representative of employees on the basis of a showing of
majority support through authorization cards.
Between 2000 and 2009, eight states enacted public-sector labor
legislation mandating union recognition based on union authorization
card signatures. Table 1 reports the states with card-check legislation,
the year it was passed, and the scope of coverage the law provides.
Despite some differences in coverage and the slightly different
legislative language, these card-check laws promote union organizing
by allowing unions to achieve recognition without a certification
election, and do so in ways that provide limited opportunities for
employer interference.
16

16.

N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 207.2 (McKinney 2010). The New York Public Employee

Relations Board's rules implementing the statute provide that where only one labor
organization is seeking to represent the employees,
[t]he employee organization involved will be certified without an election if a
majority of the employees within the unit have indicated their choice by the
execution of dues deduction authorization cards which are current, or by
individual designation cards which have been executed within six months prior to
the date of the director's decision recommending certification without an election.

Id. § 201.9(g)(1). For a detailed account of the history and development of New York's cardcheck legislation, see William A. Herbert, Card Check Labor Certification:Lessons from New

York, 74 ALBANY L. REv. 93, 133 (2010).
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Table 1: Summary of State's Card-Check Laws, (2000-2009)
State
North Dakota17

Year
May 2001

Scope
Applicable only to teachers.

California"

January
2002
August
2003

Applicable to employees of any public agency,
including fire departments.
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act applies
to employees of the state, political subdivisions
of the state, and units of local government. The
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act applies
to employees of school districts, public
community
colleges, state colleges and
universities, and any state agency whose major
function is providing educational services.

January
2004

Applicable to employees in K-12 education,
secondary education, court interpreters, and
other trial employees.
Applicable to municipal employees.

Illinois"

California

Oklahoma

I April 2004

Table continues on next page.

17. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-16-07 to 15.1-16-13 (2003 & Supp. 2007).
18. The California law states:
A public agency shall grant exclusive or majority recognition to an employee
organization based on a signed petition, authorization cards, or union membership
cards showing that a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
desire the representation, unless another labor organization has previously been
lawfully recognized as exclusive or majority representative of all or part of the
same unit.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3507.1(c) (West 2010). Similar provisions are also applicable to the state's
K-12 employees, id. §§ 3544.1, 3544, 3544.7; secondary educational employees, id. §§ 3574, 3577;
court interpreters, id. § 71823(a)(5)(A); and other trial employees, id. § 71636.3.
19. "The Board shall designate an exclusive representative for purposes of collective
bargaining when the representative demonstrates a showing of majority interest by employees
in the unit." 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9(a-5) (2010). A similar provision covers educational
employees. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7(b) (2010).
20. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 51-211(B) (West 2010) (repealed 2011).
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New Jersey2 1
Massachusetts

December
2004
December

22

2007

New
Hampshire2 1

September
2007

Applicable to most public employees.

Oregon24

September
2007

Applicable to most public employees.
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Applicable to most public employees.
Applicable to most public employees.

III. THE ANTECEDENTS OF CARD-CHECK LEGISLATION

A. Overview
To the extent that card check authorization benefits unions and
imposes costs on employers, one would expect that card check
21.

The New Jersey law states:
Representatives designated or selected by public employees for the purposes of
collective negotiation by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, by the majority of the employees voting in an election conducted
by the commission as authorized by this act or, at the option of the representative
in a case in which the commission finds that only one representative is seeking to

be the majority representative, by a majority of the employees in the unit signing
authorization cards indicating their preference for that representative, shall be the
exclusive representatives for collective negotiation concerning the terms and

conditions of employment ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 2012).
22. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the commission shall certify and
the public employer shall recognize as the exclusive representative for the purpose of collective
bargaining of all the employees in the bargaining unit an employee organization which has
received a written majority authorization...." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 4 (2012).
23. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the board shall certify and the
public employer shall recognize as the exclusive representative an employee organization which
has received a written majority authorization for the purpose of collective bargaining of all the

employees in the bargaining unit." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:10, IX (Supp. 2007).
(repealed 2011).
24.

The Oregon law states:

Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, when an employee, group of
employees or labor organization acting on behalf of the employees files a
petition alleging that a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for the

purpose of collective bargaining wish to be represented by a labor
organization for that purpose, the board shall investigate the petition. If the

board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
bargaining have signed authorizations designating the labor organization
specified in the petition as the employees' bargaining representative and that
no other labor organization is currently certified or recognized as the
exclusive representative of any of the employees in the unit, the board may

not conduct an election but shall certify the labor organization as the
exclusive representative unless a petition for a representation election is filed

as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.682(2)(a) (2011).
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authorization would be most controversial in contexts where
opposition to union organizing is stronger and union organizing
outcomes are less certain. Such is the case in the U.S. private sector,
where there is vehement employer opposition to unions, and union
election win rates have often fluctuated around 50 percent. 5 This
proposition may explain why unions have failed to achieve labor law
reform at the federal level, where labor advocates have faced
insurmountable resistance to a variety of legislative initiatives which
would facilitate the process through which employees organize
collectively. These include proposals seeking to expedite
representation elections26 and strengthen the rights of organizers,27
and more recently mandating recognition via card checks.28
This proposition also helps explain why card-check legislation
had gained more traction in the public sector. Recent events in Ohio
and Wisconsin, notwithstanding, labor relations in the public sector
have been less contentious than the experiences in the private sector.
A key difference between public-sector employees and private-sector
employees is that public-sector workers are simultaneously
employees and "bosses," because as citizens they can cast votes that
help determine the makeup of local and state governments and
thereby determine the officials who will be their supervisors. In short,
public employees can influence who sits across the bargaining table.29
The political nature of public employment suggests that, relative
to their private-sector counterparts, labor advocates in the public
sector are likely to be more successful when seeking legislation that
will facilitate their ability to circumvent the nonunion default rule
2

25. Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discriminationfor Union Activity Under the
NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 317, 330-31 (1998) (noting that the violations of
section 8(a)(3) - the type of unfair labor practice charge most likely to be filed in the course of
an organizing campaign - per election held, increased nearly four times between 1969 and 1997);
see also JOHN SCHMITT & BEN ZIPPERER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, DROPPING
THE Ax: ILLEGAL FIRINGS DURING UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (2007) (finding a steep rise
in the 2000s relative to the last half of the 1990s in illegal firings of pro-union workers).
Although the upward trend in employers' violations of the NLRA is well documented, the
reasons behind the increase are less clear. Some commentators argue the increase could be
attributed to the relatively weak penalties provided under the NLRA. See Morris,supra, at 318.
26. See Brudney. supranote 8.
27. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, FACT FINDING
REPORT 46-47 (1994), available at <http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1279&context=key-workplace>.
28. See JON 0. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21887, THE EMPLOYEE
FREE CHOICE ACT 1 & n.1 (2011), available at <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21887

_20110112.pdf>.
29.

See Clyde Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE

L.J. 1156, 1160 (1973).
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that characterizes public-sector labor law. If the public-sector labor
relations environment often mitigates against aggressive employer
opposition to public-sector union organizing, which consequently
eases union organizing efforts and leads to higher union win rates in
certification elections, then public-sector employers may not object
strongly, if at all, to changes in the organizing process that "benefit"
unions.
This framework helps explain not only the difference one
observes between the public and private sectors, but also the
differences one observes in the favorableness of public-sector labor
policies among states. In the context of card-check legislation, the
model helps us explore factors likely to be associated with the
enactment of such laws.
For our analyses, we view labor law as a political outcome that
emerges from conflicts between labor and management that are
"conducted within an ideological, partisan, and economic
environment.""' Accordingly, a logical hypothesis for why card-check
legislation is proposed and/or enacted in some states and not others is
that such laws simply reflect the environmental reality surrounding
public-sector labor relations in that state. Namely, unions are able to
organize public-sector employee groups with little opposition from
employers and with a high expectation of success. Without strong
employer opposition to union organizing, and in an environment with
a high percentage of union victories, card check authorization
removes unnecessary steps in the organizing process. Both sides
benefit from the reduced cost compared to the union certification
election process. The passage of card-check legislation, rather than
representing a significant victory for unions over unreceptive
employers, simply reflects an incremental change in an already liberal
labor relations environment.
A testable implication of this hypothesis is that card-check
legislation is more likely to be proposed, and ultimately enacted, in
states that already have more favorable public sector labor laws and a
more highly unionized public-sector workforce. Because the policy
process unfolds over time, prior policies affect present policy
decisions. Accordingly, one would expect card-check legislation to
occur in states which already have collective bargaining legislation.
30. See David Jacobs & Marc Dixon, The Politics of Labor-Management Relations:
Detecting the Conditions that Affect Changes in Right-to-Work Laws, 53 SOC. PROBS. 118, 119
(2006).
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The existence of a state law granting public-sector workers the right
to unionize and engage in collective bargaining establishes legitimacy
for card-check legislation and may eliminate barriers that public
officials could otherwise confront. In short, incremental change from
an existing collective bargaining law to card check authorization is
much more likely than passing protective labor legislation where
none exists.
B. Empirical Model
Our focus is on factors that may affect the passage of a cardcheck law in a state legislature. If we can identify important
differences between states that passed card-check laws and those that
did not, it might be possible to better predict other future changes in
public-sector labor law. For this purpose, we identify three sets of
variables as likely to be associated with the passage of public-sector
card-check legislation - the political environment; constituency
disposition; and contextual demand variables that may increase the
likelihood citizens will support pro-labor legislation for public
employees.
Political Environment: Conservative political parties, namely
Republicans, tend to support policies that benefit affluent
constituents. Consequently, they are more inclined to oppose union
favorable policies. In contrast, Democrats are more likely to support
union favorable policies. We expect that card-check laws are more
likely to be adopted in states where Democrats control the state's
legislative and executive branches.
Constituency Disposition: Labor's organizational strength should
affect its ability to organize politically and affect policy outcomes. The
percent of the state's public-sector workforce that is unionized is used
to represent the organizational strength of unions. Prior research has
established a strong link between union strength and the presence of
comprehensive public-sector labor legislation." Consequently, the
effect of public-sector unionization on card-check legislation reflects
not only the political strength of unions, but also the favorableness of
a state's public-sector labor legislation.
While higher levels of public-sector unionization should be
associated with the passage of card-check legislation, its effect may
31. See Richard B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 41
(1986).
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vary by the receptiveness of state legislators, which in turn may be
tempered by the strength of opposition towards unions by other
constituents who may oppose unions (e.g., employer organizations).
To capture the presence of such opposition we identify those states
that have enacted a right-to-work law (RTW). We use RTW to test
whether the effects of public-sector union power on the passage of
card-check legislation vary between right-to-work and non-right-towork states. We expect the effects of union power on card check
passage to be significantly diminished in right-to-work states due to
the presence of ideological opposition to unions.
Contextual Demand: Enactment of card-check legislation is likely
to be related to other characteristics of the state. For example, high
unemployment reduces union collective bargaining power, but may
lead unions to increase their political efforts, especially since public
sympathy and support for workers increase during economic
recessions.32 The average unemployment rate, therefore, is expected
to be positively associated with the passage of card-check legislation.
Racial divisions are thought to interfere with labor's ability to wage
successful concerted action,33 because they undermine the solidarity
required to establish support for policies that help the less affluent.
Thus, states with high percentages of minority employment should be
less likely to pass legislation that favors labor unions. Prior research
also suggests that because "redistributive legislation is more likely
[a]ffluent states
when mean prosperity is most substantial ...
therefore should be more likely to enact provisions that help labor."34
We use per capita income in the state as our measure of affluence.
Finally, public-sector employees have a stake in legislation that
affects them, even in the absence of union representation. To account
for their political influence in state policy making, we include a
variable measuring the percentage of total employment comprised of
government employment. The variables used in the analyses are
described in Appendix A.
In Table 2 we show the means and standard deviations for each
variable separately for states which passed card-check legislation after
2000 and those which did not. All of the analyses use data from 2000
to 2009.

32.

See Gary N. Chaison & Joseph B. Rose, The Macrodeterminantsof Union Growth and

Decline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 3 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991).
33. See WILLIAM H. FORM, SEGMENTED LABOR, FRACTURED POLITICS (1995).
34.

See Jacobs & Dixon, supra note 29, at 124.
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Table 2: Comparing States with and without Card-Check
Legislation, (2000-2009)35
Variable Name

Passed
Card-Check
Legislation
(N=80)

No Card-Check
Legislation
(N=420)

t-value

PERCENTPUBUNION

44.6

31.1

6.5***

RTW

.22

.48

-4.2***

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

.34

.15

3.9***

PERCENT GOVERNMENT

14.2

15.4

-3.4***

PERCENTMINORITY

6.8
33286.2

11.7

-3.3***

PCI

29418

6.9***

STATE POPULATION

9074.4

5274.1

4.9***

UNEMPLOYMENT

5.2

5.2

.11

Table 2 reveals some interesting findings. States which passed
card-check legislation for some group(s) of public employees during
2000-2009 differed significantly from states that did not for all
variables, except average annual unemployment. They had
significantly higher rates of public-sector union density, were
significantly more likely to have democratic control of both the
executive and legislative branches of government, were more affluent,
and, not surprisingly, were significantly less likely to be right-to-work
states. They were also significantly more populous states, but had
significantly lower percentages of minority employment and
government employment.
The results suggest that the level of constituent support for
unions, (as represented by the presence of RTW legislation and by
our measure of public-sector union density), and the ability of the
35.

Significance: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.O (all tests are two-tail). Data for RTW were obtained

from Right to Work States, NAT'L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND. (2012),
<http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm>. UNEMPLOYMENT data for all years can be found at <http://
www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/allnr.htm#SRGUNE>. Data for DEMOCRATIC CONTROL, PCI,
and PERCENT GOVERNMENT were obtained from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States

issued by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data for total employment, and black employment (which
were used to calculate PERCENT GOVERNMENT, and PERCENT MINORITY) were obtained from

the Bureau of Labor Statistics; for Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming, data on black employment
were not reported, so the percent nonwhite is used instead. Union data were obtained from
Barry T. Hirsch et al., Estimates of Union Density by State, MONTHLY LAB. REv., July 2001, at
51, and accompanying data from Union Density Estimates by State, 1964-2011, <http://union
stats.gsu.edu/MonthlyLa borReviewArticle.htm> (last viewed Nov. 5, 2012).
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public to translate such preferences into legislation, (as represented
by Democratic control of the state legislative and executive
branches), appear to be related to the enactment of card-check laws.
To further test our hypotheses, we employ a pooled crosssectional regression analysis using data from 2000 through 2009.
Essentially, our basic research question is: What factors are
significantly associated with a state's passage of card-check legislation
during the time period 2000-2009 when controlling for various other
factors that may affect passage of such laws? This empirical approach
enables us to assess the effects on card check adoption of various
state characteristics that vary over time, because annual longitudinal
adoption is captured by the pooled cross-sections. Moreover, because
we use pooled cross-sectional data, our data allow card check
adoption to be affected by "independent variables with the right time
property."36 Of course, the major drawback with this type of study is
that there is very little variance in the dependent variable, making it
difficult to find significant effects using pooled cross-sectional time
series data. In this study, only eight states adopted card-check
legislation from 2000 to 2009 (1.6 percent of the state-year
observations).
Because our dependent variable, CCLAW, is dichotomous,
logistic regression is used to produce the results. To accurately reflect
the policy making process, for states which adopt a card-check law we
code the dependent variable, CCLAW, equal to one both the year the
law was passed, t, and in year t-1. By specifying the dependent
variable in this manner, we are accounting for the fact that the
adoption of innovative legislation is the end product of an often
lengthy process in which policy proposals arrive on a government's
policy agenda, alternatives are identified, and an authoritative choice
is made from among those alternatives by a legislative body.37 In
short, new policy does not emerge from thin air; rather it occurs
through a process (sometimes quite lengthy) of development, debate,
36. Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy
Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 399 (1990).
37. JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 4 (1984). The
manner in which we specified the dependent variable is consistent with the experiences of the
various states which the card-check laws have been enacted. For example, in every state but one
(North Dakota), the bills that eventually became laws were introduced very early in the
calendar year (January or February) of the year before or the same year in which the laws
became effective. One would expect that the type of discussions (formal and informal) that lead
to a bill being introduced begin several months before the time the bill is brought before a
committee.
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and authoritative decision making.
C. Results
Table 3 shows the results from the logistic regression analysis.
All models include variables to control for time and state population.
And all models include a variable, POST CC LAW, coded as 1 for
states having card-check legislation, to account for states that had
laws prior to 2000 and for a change in a state's legal regime after
passing a card-check law. Although it is possible that a state could
pass multiple card-check laws covering different public employee
groups, we expect the presence of a card-check law to decrease the
likelihood of passing later card-check legislation. We begin the
analyses by entering the contextual demand, political elite, and
constituency disposition variables into the equation separately to see
how they relate to the passage of card-check legislation when not
controlling for the other factors. These results, which are shown in
models 1 through 4, provide support for some of our hypotheses. As
predicted, per capita income (model 1), democratic control of state
government (model 2) and the percent of public-sector workers who
are unionized (models 3 and 4) are positively and significantly
associated with the adoption of card-check legislation. Percent
minority (model 1 and 4) and post card-check law (models 1, 3 and 4)
are negatively and significantly associated with the adoption of cardcheck legislation. Likewise, though we did not hypothesize an effect,
state population is positively and significantly associated with the
adoption of card-check legislation (all models).
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Analyses Determinants of State
Card-Check Laws, (2000-2009)"
Explanatory Variable

Model 1
Coeff.
(S.E.)

Model 2
Coeff.
(S.E.)

Model 3
Coeff.
(S.E.)

Model 4
Coeff.
(S.E.)

PERCENT PUBUNION

.05*

.07*

RTW

(.03)
.39
(1.01)

(.04)
.52
(1.52)

Constituency
Variables

Disposition

PERCENT PUBUNION * RTW

.18*

(.10)
PoliticalElite Variable

1.50***
.52)

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

2.44***

.68)

ContextualDemand Variables
UNEMPLOYMENT

.06

-. 18

PCI

(.20)
.02E-2***
(.006E-2)

PERCENT GOVERNMENT

-. 05

(.24)
.15E-3**
.06E-3)
-. 14
(.16)

PERCENT MINORITY

POST CC LAW
STATE POPULATION

(.10)
-. 12*
(.06)(.8
-2.61**
(1.21)

.19**

-1.25
(.87)

-2.14**
(.99)

-2.63**
(1.15)

.10E-3**

.10E-

.10E-3**

.09E-3**

(.03E-3)

3***

(.03E-3)

(.04E-3)

-.08

-.07

-.04
(0)
.09(.10)

-.11
(.12)

22.29***

48.53***

(.03E-3)_____

YEAR

.09)
LIKELIHOOD RATIO

31.96***

21.43***

In general, the contextual demand variables had mixed
performance at predicting the adoption of card-check legislation, and
38.

Significance: *<.10 **<.05 ***<.01 (all tests are two-tail).
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we failed to find much evidence that the presence of right-to-work
legislation significantly reduces the likelihood that a state would
adopt card-check legislation.39
When all the variables enter the analysis together, along with the
interaction term between the percent public-sector unionized and
right-to-work, no changes appear in the significant results found in
the other models. However, interesting findings emerge with the
effects of the constituency disposition variables on the passage of
card-check legislation. To see whether the strong positive relationship
between public sector unionization and the passage of card-check
legislation is dampened by anti-union forces in a state, we included
the interaction term between the percent of unionized public
employees and the presence of a right-to-work law (PERCENT
PUBUNION*RTW) in model 4. For this analysis, PERCENT PUBUNION

is centered to aid in the interpretation of the results.40 The results
show that public-sector unionization has significant, positive effects
on the passage of card-check legislation in non-right-to-work states
(bPercent Pubunion). The model 4 results also show that the effects of rightto-work legislation on the passage of card-check legislation are
positive but not significant at the mean level of percent public
unionized for the sample (bRTw). Moreover, the significant, negative
coefficient for the interaction term PERCENT PUBUNION*RTW
suggests that public sector unionization does not significantly affect
the passage of card-check legislation in right-to-work states. In fact,
by reverse coding RTW so that RTW=1 for non-RTW states and then
re-running the model 4 analyses, we find that public sector
unionization does not significantly affect the passage of card-check
legislation in right-to-work states (bPercent Pubunion=-.11; p>.2. 41 In short, a
strong anti-labor environment in a state, as evidenced by a right-to-

39. The latter finding may be due in part to high multicollinearity between right-to-work
legislation (our measure of anti-union ideology in the state) and the percent of public-sector
workers who are unionized (r=-.73); in fact, when the right-to-work variable is entered into the
equation separately without the percentage of public-sector workers who are unionized, it has
significant, negative effects on the passage of card-check legislation (p<.10). These results are
available upon request from the authors.
40. Centering is done by subtracting the mean value of a variable from each observation to
obtain a mean of 0 for the centered variable. Doing so aids in the interpretation of regression
coefficients and is thought to reduce multicollinearity among predictor variables. Kristopher
Preacher, A Primer on Interaction Effects in Multiple Linear Regression (2003), <http://www.
quantpsy.org/interact/interactions.htm>. After PERCENT PUBUNION is "centered" the
coefficient for RTW shows the difference between right-to-work and non-right-to-work states at
the mean percent public sector unionized for the sample.
41. These results are available upon request from the authors.
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work law, appears to negate the otherwise positive effects of publicsector unionization on the passage of card-check legislation.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF CARD-CHECK LEGISLATION
Having explored the antecedents of public-sector card-check
legislation, we now briefly describe the relationship between the
presence of card-check laws and increases in union membership. We
then re-examine data from an empirical study we recently conducted
on this same issue. 42
A. Card-Check Laws and Unionization Rates
According to Professor Benjamin Sachs, labor policy represents
a legislative choice between having a union or a nonunion default
rule. 43 The NLRA and public sector collective bargaining laws in the
states establish the default status of workplaces as being nonunion. 44
To facilitate union organizing under this legal regime, labor advocates
have focused on legislative changes that might make it easier for
workers to circumvent the nonunion default rule. 45 Card-check
legislation
accomplishes
this
by
minimizing managements'
involvement in the union organizing process, making it easier for
employees to depart from the nonunion default rule.
Because card check organizing should make organizing easier, a
card-check law should lead public sector unions to organize using
card checks rather than elections. Moreover, a card-check statute
might enable unions to not only organize new workplaces, but also
new types of workplaces. In short, card-check legislation should lead
to more union organizing and, consequently, higher levels of union
membership.
Indeed, prior research involving private-sector organizing
outcomes in Canada and the United States confirm the facilitating
effects of card check use on union organizing.46 Although the contexts
examined in these studies differ from the U.S. public sector, where
42. See Chandler & Gely, supra note 6.
43. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A StructuralApproach to the Rules
of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010).
44. Id. at 659, 664.
45. See id. at 673, 693-94 (explaining why these changes would help circumvent the default
rule).
46. See E. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4; Chris Riddell, Union CertificationSuccess under
Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures:Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1988, 57 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 493 (2004).
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union success rates in representation elections tend to be quite high,
recent research demonstrates the positive effects of card-check
*47
organizing on public-sector union membership.
B. Card-Check Laws and Union Membership Trends
Public-sector union membership in the U.S. increased by nearly
445,000 members from 7.1 million in 2000 to over 7.5 million in 2011.
As shown in Figure 1, most of this increase (70 percent) was
concentrated in the eight states which passed card-check legislation
(CC States). While it is true that these eight states had two times the
average government employment than the other forty-two states,48 the
increase in union membership was also reflected in increases in union
density. From 2000 to 2011, average union density for the eight states
which passed card-check legislation increased from 42.4 percent in
2000 to 46.5 percent in 2011. In contrast, average union density for
the other forty-two states was virtually unchanged, 31.9 percent in
2000 and 31.3 percent in 2011.

47.

Union success rates in public sector representation elections are near 85 percent, or at

least were in 1991 and 1992, see, for example, KATE BRONFENBRENNER & TOM JURAVICH,
UNION ORGANIZING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

11 (1995). For evidence of the positive effects of card-check legislation, see Chandler and Gely,
supra note 6.
48. From 2000-2009 average government employment in the states that did not pass cardcheck legislation after 2000 was approximately 335,000 compared to nearly 703,000 for the eight
states that passed a card-check law.
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Figure 1: Public-Sector Union Membership Growth, (2000-2011)

To provide a more nuanced examination of the impact of passing
card-check legislation on union membership and density, we compare the
eight states that passed card-check laws after 2000 to the forty-two states that
did not. Within these broad categories, all states were further sorted based
on the overall favorableness of the state's public sector labor legislation. The
bargaining laws are categorized as either comprehensive, indicating that
bargaining rights are granted to nearly all occupations, or narrow, indicating
that there are no bargaining rights for some occupations, or as no law,
indicating that the state has no bargaining legislation providing unionization
and collective bargaining rights to public-sector employees (this category
also includes two states that explicitly prohibit collective bargaining). 49 Table
4 shows average union membership and density for groups of states having
different legal regimes governing public-sector employees for years 2000 to
2011, as well as average annual union membership (density), average annual
change in union membership (density) and the numbers of states included in
each category.
A number of interesting comparisons are possible in Table 4.
Examining within category changes over time, one finds generally positive
trends in union membership under all labor law regimes, except for states
49. JOHN W. BUDD, LABOR RELATIONS: STRIKING A BALANCE 137-38 (3d ed. 2010). The
occupational groups in question are police and fire, state employees, public school teachers, and
municipal employees.
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that did not pass card-check legislation and also had narrow bargaining laws
(column 5). However, the increases in union membership translated to
increases in union density only for those states that had comprehensive
bargaining laws, regardless of whether the state passed card-check
legislation. The six states with comprehensive bargaining laws which passed
card-check legislation had an average annual increase in union density of .45
(4275.6 union members per year), compared to a more modest increase in
union density of .05 (666.6 union members per year) for states with
comprehensive bargaining legislation that did not pass card-check
legislation. Likewise, despite declining union density for states with narrow
labor laws, the two states that passed card-check legislation experienced an
average annual decline of only -.004 compared to a decrease in average
union density of -.23 for the thirteen states that did not pass card-check
legislation. Indeed union membership actually increased by an average of
196.2 members per year for the two states with card-check laws and narrow
bargaining legislation compared to an average decrease in union
membership of -504.4 members per year for the narrow law states.
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Table 4: Union Membership (Density) Under Various Labor Law Regimes,
(2000-2011)

Year
(New
CardCheck

States Which Passed
Card-Check Law
Comprehensive Narrow
Bargaining
Labor
Law
Law

States Which Didn't Pass Card-Check
Law
Comprehensive Narrow
No
Bargaining
Labor
Protection
Law
Law

363524.8
(51.03)
370163.0
(50.9)
402288.5
(53.9)
392096.8
(52.1)
388237.2
(51.8)

27341
(16.6)
31580.5
(19.0)
39402
(22.4)
31667
(21.45)
29826.5
(18.8)

153866.1
(42.95)
150557.5
(41.8)
148874.6
(41.7)
155183.1
(41.4)
153864.8
(40.65)

104561.2
(26.35)
105767.62
(25.9)
105514.1
(25.4)
105024.3
(25.0)
102534.4
(24.48)

46536
(15.41)
50706
(16.1)
52083.3
(16.2)
46516.8
(14.8)
50176.9
(15.37)

395063
(53.9)
388362.7
(53.2)
400252.8
(52.2)

28201
(18.1)
31658
(18.0)
36282.5
(18.4)

159763.4
(41.8)
158574
(42.6)
163092.2
(43.2)

104355.3
(23.7)
103659.1
(23.8)
104462.4
(23.5)

48520.1
(15.3)
50244.7
(15.9)
49903.1
(14.8)

438027.5
(56.4)
4344020.33
(56.8)
422387
(53.8)
414832
(56.5)

33270
(17.1)
30950
(17.1)
24445
(15.3)
29695
(16.5)

167247.9
(42.54)
169475.4
(44.2)
163597.4
(43.4)
161865.6
(43.55)

101584.8
(23.58)
103608.7
(24.0)
100288.1
(23.8)
98505.1
(23.58)

50582.7
(15.15)
53140.6
(15.4)
50067.6
(14.2)
52208.1
(15.25)

Laws)

2000
2001
(ND)
2002
(CA)
2003
(IL)
2004
(NJ,
OK)
2005
2006
2007
(MA,
NH,
OR)
2008
2009
2010
2011

Table continues on next page.
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Average
All Years

400771.3
(53.5)

31193.2
(18.2)

158830.2
(42.5)

103322.3
(24.4)

50057.2
(15.3)

Average
Annual

4664.3
(.49)

214
(-.004)

727.2
(.05)

-550.3
(-25)

515.6
(-.01)

6

2

20

13

9

Change

Number
of States

What is not reflected in Table 4 is whether changes in union
membership (density) in card check states can be linked to the passage of
card-check legislation. Figure 2 compares average annual membership
growth in card check states with changes occurring under other labor law
regimes. For states which passed card-check laws, we show average
membership increases pre- and post-passage of card-check legislation. For all
state groupings we also show average annual membership growth for years
2000-2006 and years 2007-2011. The latter time period is especially
noteworthy because by 2007, all eight states had passed their card-check
laws.
As seen in Figure 2, average annual union membership increased
from approximately 3800 union members pre-card check passage to just over
5000 post-card check passage for states which had comprehensive bargaining
laws. This represents an increase of 34 percent in average annual
membership growth. In contrast, the two states with narrow laws which
passed card-check legislation showed almost no change in average annual
membership after passage of their card-check laws (-34 members annually).
Comparing trends in annual membership growth from 2000-2006 to 20072011 is perhaps more revealing. Average annual membership growth was
observed under several of the legal regimes after 2006. But compared to
membership growth for 2000-2006, post-2006 growth was larger only for
comprehensive law states that passed card-check legislation. Likewise,
although narrow law states which passed card-check legislation experienced
average annual membership losses after 2006, the losses were much greater
in narrow law states that did not pass card-check laws.

50. This comparison suffers from a very small sample size for the pre-card check category
(n=3); moreover, all of the observations are from just one state, Oklahoma.
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Figure 2: Average Annual Membership Growth

V. LESSONS LEARNED

Perhaps appropriately so, the anti-union policies recently
implemented in states like Ohio and Wisconsin has received much attention
recently. The policies adopted in these states represent a serious threat to
the ability of their public-sector employees to organize and, to the extent
similar policies might be adopted in other states, a threat to the entire union
movement among public employees. However, it is important to know that
shortly before these most recent developments, a fairly progressive trend
was developing across a non-trivial minority of states. By 2008 a total of
twelve states had enacted card-check legislation covering at least some of
their public sector employees with eight of those occurring just between 2001
and 2008. This article analyzes two specific aspects of such legislation: its
antecedents and its effects.
Regarding the antecedents of card-check laws, along with other
contextual factors, our results indicate that a strong public-sector union
presence (as represented by our measure of public-sector union density), and
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their ability to translate policy preferences into legislation, (as represented
by the Democratic control of the state legislative and executive branches),
are important factors in influencing whether card-check laws are enacted.
Yet the positive effects of public-sector unionization on the passage of cardcheck legislation are limited to states not having right-to-work legislation,
which we include as a proxy for opposition to organized labor in a state.
Our findings have implications for the long standing debate about
the extent to which unions should pursue their objectives via political and
electoral activities. For over a century, U.S. labor leaders have struggled with
whether unions should seek to achieve their objectives at the workplace
through collective bargaining, or more broadly, through political activities.
Our results appear to support the importance of political action for publicsector unions. The enactment of favorable legislation seems to be dependent
not only on electoral political activity, but also on having a broad base of
support as reflected in higher union density rates and in more liberal
ideological preferences across the relevant electorate that might translate
into support for unions. While spending resources on union organizing in
order to expand their base of support might be a necessary condition for the
enactment of favorable legislation, unions may need to do more. A broad
base of support as reflected in higher union density rates and an otherwise
favorable political environment are both important to achieving legislative
victories. As the recent events in Wisconsin and other states illustrate,
elections matter, and having success in electing politicians who are likely to
support worker-friendly policies, matter even more.
Our results also indicate that unions should consider expanding their
outreach efforts beyond the purely electioneering type of activities.
Operating in the context of an ideologically friendly electorate facilitates the
enactment of legislation favorable to the interests of employees. While state
ideology is difficult and perhaps impossible to change in the short run, on
certain issues in which the public might be evenly divided, massive efforts to
educate the public might prove beneficial to labor's long term interests.
Unions might be able to alter community perceptions by establishing
operations in a community and engaging in community building activities
even in the absence of immediate organizing activity. 2 Allocating resources

to alter individuals' perceptions about unions and to allow communities to
experience the benefits of collective action, might be necessary to pursue
broader union goals.
Regarding the effects of card-check laws, our results confirm
expectations regarding the potential impact of card-check legislation on
union organizing. Concern about employer hostility as an impediment to

51.

See David Reynolds, Coalitions Politics: Insurgent Union PoliticalAction Builds Ties

Between Labor and the Community, LAB. STUD. J., Sept. 1, 1999, at 54.

52. See Bruce Nissen, Alternative Strategic Directionsfor the U.S. Labor Movement: Recent
Scholarship, 28 LAB. STUD. J., Mar. 1, 2003, at 133, 141-43, 144-48.
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union organizing has been traditionally associated with private-sector
employers. The widely held view has long been that public-sector employees
face a much more favorable organizing environment. Public employers'
budgets are not dependent on profits and public-sector unions have political
clout that is especially meaningful to vote-maximizing politicians.
Accordingly, public employers might avoid aggressive opposition to unions
during union organizing and collective bargaining. Yet even in an
environment where big gains to unions from card-check laws might not be
expected, we find that such laws facilitate union membership growth.
Although our analyses predate recent attacks on public sector
unions that occurred in states like Ohio and Wisconsin, these events
highlight the significance of our findings. The aggressive manner which
governors Scott Walker in Wisconsin and John Kasich in Ohio pursued antilabor legislation may prove to be a defining moment for the public-sector
labor movement, marking a new willingness by public officials to oppose
organizing efforts by their employees. If so, card check organizing should
become a more preferred method of organizing for public employee unions
as they seek to avoid aggressively anti-union employers during organizing
campaigns. However, if public employers and the public become more
hostile toward public-sector unions, it also seems unlikely that other states
will adopt card-check legislation, leaving public employees in a situation
similar to that of their private-sector counterparts.
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APPENDIX A. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Definition
Dependent Variable
CCLAW

A dummy variable equal to one if state passed
card-check legislation covering some portion of
the public sector workforce in year t or t+1.

Independent Variables
DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

PERCENT PUBUNION
PCI
PERCENT MINORITY
PERCENT GOVERNMENT

POST CC LAW
STATE POPULATION
RTW

A dummy variable equal to one if democrats
control both houses of the state legislature and the
state's governor is a Democrat.
Percent of state's public sector labor force that is
unionized.
Per capita income (personal income/population,
measured in 2000 dollars).
Percent of labor force that is minority.
Percent of total employment in government.

A dummy variable equal to one if a state has a
card-check law.
State population in thousands.
A dummy variable equal to one if the state has a
right-to-work law.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The average annual unemployment rate.

TIME

A variable equal to yeart-1989.

